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Abstract
Some ways of talking or thinking about the world are better than others. Most obviously,
it is often better to say or believe true things rather than false things. Perhaps less obvious is the
notion that our speech and thought ought to, or often in fact does, reflect the natural formation or
structure of the world. This idea—that we ought to be carving the world at its natural joints—
can be found at least as far back as Plato’s Phaedrus. More recently, we can see a related idea in
the work of David Lewis. In “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Lewis argued that there is
a special set of properties—the natural properties—that carve the world at its joints. In Lewis’s
sense, the notion of a natural property is a complex one: it plays a number of conceptual and
explanatory roles. In this thesis, I first detail some important background on properties in
general. I then shift my focus to Lewis’s natural properties and the various roles he had in mind
for them. In doing so, I pay particularly close attention to the supposed connection between
natural properties and the metasemantic notion of reference magnetism. I consider the question
of whether there exists a unique set of properties that can play all of Lewis’s roles. I argue that
there is no such set. I then conclude by arguing that there are good reasons to deny that there are
natural properties in the Lewisian sense.
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Section 1: Introduction
Some ways of talking or thinking about the world are better than others. Most obviously,
it is often better to say or believe true things rather than false things. Perhaps less obvious is the
notion that we should, or often in fact do, talk in such a way that divides (or “carves”) the world
up according to its natural formation, its joints, or its true structure. In the Phaedrus, Plato’s
Socrates is not shy about his preference for this way of talking:
“Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together,
as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can
naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and ‘walk in his
footsteps as if he were a god.’”1
It is true that when we group things together in a natural way—when we carve the world at its
joints, so to speak—we are able to make generalizations that we otherwise could not. Thus, it is
good to have a word like ‘tiger’ that groups together all and only tigers—not some haphazard,
miscellaneous assortment of objects. This particular word allows us make generalizations like
‘tigers have four legs’. Of course, there may be a few three-legged tigers roaming around the
world, but the point is that the generalization remains extremely useful.
More recently, there have been systematic defenses of dividing up the world in a natural
way. In particular, the twentieth-century philosopher David Lewis argued that there are special
properties—the natural properties—that carve the world at its joints. He distinguished the
natural properties from the unnatural properties, those that “carve reality at the joints—and
everywhere else as well.”2 In Lewis’s eyes, the natural properties helped not only with things
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Phaedrus, 266b.
Lewis (1983, p. 346).
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like generalization; he thought they could do a lot of other interesting work as well. For
example, Lewis thought the natural properties were the properties whose sharing made for
genuine resemblance. The things that have the property being a tiger resemble one another more
than the things that have the property being either a tiger or a lion. This is because the former
property is more natural than the latter.
This role of explaining resemblance is just one among many that Lewis had in mind. In
this thesis, I consider the question of whether there exists a set of properties that can play all of
the various roles that Lewis intended natural properties to play. I argue that there is ultimately
no such set.
I proceed in the following way. In Section 2, I lay out some important conceptual and
historical background on properties. In Section 3, I detail the various conceptual and explanatory
roles that Lewis intended natural properties to play. In Section 4, I raise a number of problems
for the joint-satisfaction of these roles. Though I consider a number of problematic sets of roles,
I pay particularly close attention to natural properties and their supposed connection to the
metasemantic notion of reference magnetism, the idea that natural properties are more “eligible”
referents for predicates. I conclude, in Section 5, by arguing that there are good reasons to deny
the existence of natural properties as Lewis conceived of them.

2

Section 2: Properties
2.1 – Basics
Suppose I utter the following sentence: ‘The Empire State Building is tall’. When I say
this sentence, it is natural to interpret me as attributing a property (or characteristic, or quality) to
an object. I am using the expression ‘The Empire State Building’ to refer to, or to pick out, a
particular object in the world: the building that is located at the southwest corner of Fifth
Avenue and 34th Street in New York City. And we might say that I am using the predicate ‘is
tall’ to attribute the property being tall to this object that I have picked out. A similar
phenomenon presumably occurs with the utterance of any declarative sentence.3 So, when one
says ‘The Empire State building is in New York City’, for instance, this involves the predication
of the property being in New York City to a particular object, the Empire State Building.
While some predicates may attribute properties to single objects, others may instead
relate multiple objects. For example, suppose I say ‘The Empire State Building is taller than the
Chrysler Building’. When I utter this sentence, it is natural to interpret me as relating two
objects: the Empire State building and the Chrysler Building. I am using the expressions ‘The
Empire State Building’ and ‘the Chrysler Building’ to pick out two distinct objects, and I am
using ‘is taller than’ to predicate the being taller than relation between these two objects. It is
common to call such a relation dyadic, as it relates two objects. In principle, however, a relation
could relate more than two objects. For example, if I say ‘One World Trade Center is taller than

A notable exception would be a sentence like ‘Redness is a color’, which involves the
predication of a property to another property rather than predication of a property to an object.
If one wants to say that properties are themselves objects, then perhaps this is not a genuine
exception. There are reasons, however, to distinguish substances from properties, and I discuss
this in more detail later on. At any rate, we should at least recognize this phenomenon, which we
might call second-order predication.
3
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both the Empire State Building and the Chrysler Building’, I am, of course, relating three
objects. I am using a triadic relation: x is taller than y, z. On a related note, it is also common
to think of relations themselves as having properties. For example, the dyadic relation being
taller than has the property of asymmetry: if x is taller than y, then it is not the case that y is
taller than x. Compare this to the being a sibling of relation, which is symmetric: if x is the
sibling of y, then y is the sibling of x.
To summarize: properties may be predicated of single objects, and relations may be
predicated between more than one object. In what follows, whatever I say of properties may also
be said of relations; so I will mostly speak in terms of properties. And whenever I speak of
properties, I will typically denote them with an italicized expression like ‘being F’, though it is
also common practice to denote them with names like ‘F-ness’ or ‘F-hood’.
It is important to distinguish predicates from properties. A predicate like ‘is tall’ is a
linguistic entity—it can be written on paper or spoken aloud. A property, on the other hand, is
another kind of entity. It is not obvious exactly what kind of entity a property is, as properties
seem to be much different in kind from ordinary objects like buildings. Indeed, it is not obvious
whether properties truly exist at all for this same reason. (I will say more about this topic—the
ontological status of properties—shortly.) For now, though, one should at least recognize the
distinction between a predicate and a property.
A single predicate may be used to attribute multiple properties. For example, one
linguistic community may use ‘is a sport’ to mean being a competitive outdoor game between
two teams, and another might use the same predicate to mean being a game featured on ESPN.4
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Both of these uses are more restrictive than our ordinary notion of sporthood, but the point is
that a linguistic community just as easily could mean these things by ‘is a sport’ if it chose to.
Also worth noting: one might claim that we are really dealing with two predicates here—that
4

Similarly, a single speaker may use the same predicate to attribute different properties in
different contexts. For example, one speaker might use ‘is late’ to mean arriving later than the
scheduled time; but the same speaker, in a more relaxed context, might use ‘is late’ to mean
arriving later than five minutes after the scheduled time.
Conversely, multiple predicates may be used to attribute a single property. This
phenomenon is perhaps most vivid when we think of examples involving more than one
language. English speakers use ‘is blue’ to attribute the same property that Spanish speakers
attribute with ‘es azul’. The phenomenon can be intralinguistic as well. ‘Is the number two’ and
‘is the immediate successor of one’ could be used to attribute the same property: being the
number two.
Now that we have established the difference between predicates and properties, we may
still be curious about what type of entities properties are and whether they truly exist at all. This
question is historically significant. Traditionally speaking, there are two broad answers:
Realism and Nominalism.5 Realists argue that properties are real, mind-independent entities.6 It
is often argued, however, that properties cannot be the same type of thing as concrete
particulars, like rocks, tables, and chairs. You can throw a rock, but you cannot throw a
property. Thus, some (but not all) realists take properties to be abstract (as opposed to concrete)
entities, much like one might think of mathematical entities like numbers. This picture of
properties is influenced by Plato and his Forms, which were neither located in the mind nor the
external, spatio-temporal world. (Philosophers often speak of the Forms as residing in Plato’s

there is a unique linguistic entity for each meaning. If this is the case, then we no longer have a
scenario where a single predicate is used to attribute multiple properties.
5
For more on this debate, see Quine (1948) and Swoyer (2016).
6
I say ‘properties’ instead of ‘universals’ here to count trope theorists (who take properties to be
abstract particulars) as realists.
5

Heaven.) Other realists, like David Armstrong, reject this picture of properties as abstract
objects and want to “bring universals down to earth.”7 Indeed, some realists may speak of
properties as really existing out in the physical world, and they may speak of two objects as
sharing one and the same property. A realist may even speak of a property’s being wholly
present wherever it is instantiated by an object. The question of whether a property is wholly
present wherever it is instantiated is analogous to other traditional metaphysical questions. For
example, there is an interesting question about the persistence of ordinary objects like chairs: are
ordinary objects wholly present at any given time? Endurantists will answer Yes to this
question; perdurantists will answer No, that only a temporal part is present at any given time.
Nominalists, on the other hand, are skeptical of this kind of talk about properties. A
nominalist might either be skeptical of universals (and their being wholly present in multiple
spatial locations), or the nominalist may simply be skeptical of the existence of abstract objects
altogether. I will not go into more detail here, but hopefully this gives the reader a taste of the
dispute between realists and nominalists.8
2.2 – Traditional roles and historical context
Properties are of particular philosophical interest because they can arguably play a wide
range of explanatory roles. That is, properties can explain philosophically interesting
phenomena. In the philosophy of language, for instance, we are interested in the question of how
sentences and sub-sentential expressions (e.g., names and predicates) relate to the world, and we
are interested in understanding how sentences can be meaningful. To begin to answer these

7

Armstrong (1989, p. 199).
If you are skeptical of this dispute, you may be in good company. Carnap (1950) famously
argued that the question of whether abstract entities exist was a “pseudo-question,” one whose
answer depends merely on the linguistic framework we choose to adopt.
8
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questions, philosophers often speak of compositionality: the meaning of a sentence has
something to do with the meanings of its constituent sub-sentential expressions. Consider the
sentence ‘John is happy’. The meaning of this sentence has something to do with the meaning of
the name ‘John’ and the predicate ‘is happy’. The meaning (or semantic value) of ‘John’ has
something to do with the thing it refers to, the actual man who is out there in the world.9 But
what should we say about ‘is happy’? One answer is that the semantic value of a predicate is a
property—in this case being happy. As David Lewis (1983, p. 348) puts it: “It is properties we
need […] to provide an adequate supply of semantic values for linguistic expressions.”10
It is worth noting, however, that this view of properties as semantic values works best if
properties are abundant. In “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Lewis treats properties as
classes, or sets, of objects. The property being happy is just the set of all happy things. In other
words, to say that John is happy is to say that he is a member of the set of happy things. On this
type of view, it is natural to say there are an infinite number of properties, as there are an infinite
number of sets.11 To get a sense of the abundance of properties on this kind of picture, consider
the following properties: being one day old, being two days old, being three days old, etc. Also
consider disjunctive properties: either being in Arkansas or being one day old, either being in
New York or being one day old, either being in Arkansas or being two days old, etc.

9

There is an historically controversial debate in the philosophy of language about whether the
meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent, but I will not go into detail here. For answers in
the affirmative, see Mill (1882), Kripke (1980), and Salmon (1989). For an alternative answer,
see Frege (1952).
10
Though properties can play this semantic role, this is not a particularly good argument for their
existence. As Armstrong (1989, p. 199) argued, this so-called “argument from meaning”
commits a version of Gilbert Ryle’s ‘Fido’-Fido fallacy: it assumes that since some predicates
successfully refer to properties, all predicates must successfully refer to some property.
11
Indeed, in the mathematical sense, there are uncountably many properties (if properties are
merely sets). Lewis (1983, p. 346) amusingly speculates that the number is somewhere around
beth-3.
7

While David Lewis treated properties as abundant, David Armstrong treated them as
much more sparse.12 To understand Armstrong’s motivations here, we should turn to another
role that properties have traditionally played in philosophy.
One might think that properties can explain qualitative similarity or resemblance. After
all, surely the fact that one object is similar to (or resembles) another has to do with a property
that the objects share. A baseball resembles a softball (at least in part) because both share the
property of having seams. And so a crude test for degree of qualitative resemblance might be
something like the following: the degree of resemblance between any two objects is a function
of the number of properties the objects share.
It is natural to think qualitative resemblance has something to do with properties, but
there is a problem for this crude test: any two entities will share an infinite number of properties,
and any two entities will be divided by an infinite number of properties.13 This is problematic
because it implies that all objects are equally similar (and dissimilar) to one another—an
unpalatable result. We want to be able to say that a baseball is more similar to a softball than it
is to a basketball, but the crude test will not get us this result.
To see how the crude test fails, consider an example. A baseball has the property being
white, and a basketball has the property being orange. The baseball and basketball thereby share
the disjunctive property being either white or orange. And they share the property being white
or orange or on Pluto, even if neither object is on Pluto. And they share the property being
white or orange or a pencil, even though neither is a pencil. The list goes on, ad infinitum. And

12

See Armstrong (1978).
As Sider (2011, p. 3) puts it: “[C]onsider two objects x and y. Where Fx and Fy are any
features of x and y, respectively, x and y share the feature: being either Fx or Fy. And they share
the feature being either Fx or Fy or 1 kg mass. And they share the feature of being either Fx or Fy
or 2 kg mass. And so on.”
13
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despite all of these shared properties, the baseball does not thereby become extremely similar to
the basketball.14 The crude test implies that a unicorn and a softball resemble a baseball to an
equivalent degree.
So how should we answer this problem? One answer is ontological: just restrict the
number of properties that truly exist. In A Theory of Universals, David Armstrong argues
against the existence of disjunctive properties like being white or orange or on Pluto.15 “Real” or
“genuine” properties, in Armstrong’s eyes, are the ones that make for similarity, and disjunctive
properties of the form being F or G do not make for similarity. Armstrong’s point has not gone
uncontested, however. Electrons and cows do not closely resemble each other, but is it not the
case that they resemble each other in their sharing of the property being an electron or a cow?16
After all, they both exemplify electron-or-cow-hood, some will argue.
Such examples have driven philosophers like Armstrong to take a step further. Just as
there are “real” or “genuine” properties, there is also “real” or “genuine” similarity. Perhaps
electrons and cows resemble one another in some respect, but they do not genuinely resemble
one another—or so some will claim.17 An interesting consequence of this type of view is that
some natural language predicates (like ‘is either an electron or a cow’) will simply not have
corresponding properties that can serve as semantic values.18

14

One can make a similar move for the properties any two object do not share.
See Armstrong (1978, pp. 19-29).
16
See Sider (2011, p. 2), who mentions this argument but does not endorse it.
17
Or if they do genuinely resemble one another, it must be in some other respect. Perhaps cows
and electrons share the property of being roundish and resemble one another in that way.
18
For more on this point, see Armstrong (1978, p. 20). It is also worth mentioning a predicate’s
reference to any property will depend on a context of utterance. In principle, a predicate that is
grammatically disjunctive could still be used to refer to a property, even if one rejects the
existence of disjunctive properties.
15
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David Lewis answered the problem in a different way. His answer was not ontological in
the sense that he did not argue against the existence of certain properties—he allowed for an
infinite number of properties. Instead, in “New Work for a Theory of Universals” Lewis argued
(in response to Armstrong) that there was a special subset of the properties—the natural
properties—that could take on the role of explaining genuine similarity or resemblance. In some
sense, being a cow is just more natural than a disjunctive property like being an electron or a
cow.
In fact, Lewis thought that natural properties could play many more roles, too, that
properties simpliciter could not. For him, natural properties made for similarity, served as a
minimally complete supervenience base for the rest of the (classes of) properties, figured into
scientific laws, were the properties that carved reality at its joints, and were privileged semantic
values that were more eligible for reference.19 And there were other roles, too. (More on this in
Section 3.) Distinctions between types of properties, like Lewis’s between natural and unnatural
properties, are common in philosophy, and they can be used to explain many other phenomena.
For example, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties (which can help explain
duplication of objects) is of considerable philosophical interest, as is Locke’s distinction between
primary and secondary properties. Primary properties are objective properties that objects have
in themselves, while secondary properties are subjective and mind-dependent. The focus of my
present discussion, however, will be around Lewis’s notion of a natural property.
More recently, there have been defenses of Armstrong’s and Lewis’s explanations of
genuine similarity. For example, in his recent book Writing the Book of the World, Ted Sider
argues for what he calls a “realism about structure,” which involves a defense of this notion of

19

See Lewis (1983).
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genuine similarity. Lewis argued that natural properties could play many roles, and Sider’s book
extends this project. First, Sider thought natural properties (or as he often calls it, structure)
could play even more roles than Lewis indicated. For instance, he thought they could be used to
understand the philosophical notion of substantivity. There is an intuitive difference between
questions like ‘Is the Pope a bachelor?’ and questions like ‘Do electrons repel one another?’ The
answer to the first question seems to be a matter, perhaps, of what we mean by ‘is a bachelor’. If
we mean being an unmarried male, the Pope counts as a bachelor. If, on the other hand, we
mean being an unmarried male who is eligible for marriage, then the Pope will not count as a
bachelor. Thus, the answer to this question appears to depend on merely verbal or conceptual
matters. The question of ‘Do electrons repel one another?’ appears to less of a verbal or
conceptual matter and more of a worldly matter—in this sense, it is a substantive matter. What
explains the difference between these two questions? Sider says that natural properties can help.
(More on this in Section 4.)
Sider argued that natural properties could play other roles, but he also extended Lewis’s
project in another way. Sider uses his notion of structure to apply not only to predicates (which
we can say are natural if they refer to natural properties), but also to other grammatical
categories: to quantifiers (like the existential quantifier—‘∃’) and logical operators (like the
wedge for disjunction—‘∨’). In Sider’s words, he goes “beyond the predicate.”20
In the next section, I take a deeper look at Lewis’s notion of a natural property, and I say
much more about the various roles he thought they could play.

20

See Sider (2011, p. 85). Sider applies the idea of structure to many other topics—namely,
ontology and logic. In these realms, genuine similarity is not at issue.
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Section 3: Natural Properties
In this section, I begin with a brief explanation of what Lewis meant by ‘natural’. I
follow that up with some methodological points, and I conclude by discussing the various roles
that Lewis thought natural properties were well-suited to play.
3.1 – Understanding natural properties
Obviously there is some difference between being green and being green or blue.
Perhaps we might say that the former is more natural than the latter. But what do we mean by
this? Is it just that the expression ‘being green or blue’ is less simple than ‘being green’? Surely
not. The way we specify properties in English is merely a contingency. We could just as easily
talk about the property of being green or blue by using ‘being grue’21 instead—and even though
the word ‘grue’ is shorter than the word ‘green’ this would not make being grue more natural
than being green. Lewis had something different in mind by naturalness. He took it to be mindindependent and objective.
As we saw above, being green is more natural, in the Lewisian sense, than being green or
blue because the sharing of being green makes for genuine similarity. But there is more: being
green also carves the world at its joints better than gerrymandered properties like being green or
blue or being-a-person-or-a-desk. (I will say more on what this means in 3.4.) Lewis also
thought there were perfectly natural properties that were fundamental, properties that carved
perfectly at the joints. Being an electron, for instance, could turn out to be one of these perfectly
natural properties. So while there will be a limited number of perfectly natural properties, Lewis
allows for there to be a spectrum of sorts, between those properties that are perfectly natural, and
those properties that are highly unnatural and gerrymandered:

21

I should note here that I am using ‘grue’ in a different sense from Goodman (1955).
12

“Probably it would be best to say that the distinction between natural properties and
others admits of degree. Some few properties are perfectly natural. Others, even though
they may be somewhat disjunctive or extrinsic, are at least somewhat natural in a
derivative way, to the extent that they can be reached by not-too-complicated chains of
definability from the perfectly natural properties.”22
This should give the reader an idea of what Lewis had in mind when he spoke of natural
properties. And after discussing naturalness and its roles below (in Section 3.3), the reader
should have an even better understanding.
3.2 – Methodological interlude
An interesting thing about naturalness is that it does not have a straightforward analysis
or definition. Lewis treats ‘natural’ more like a theoretical term, similar to terms that are
featured in physics, like ‘mass’, ‘force’, or ‘electron’. So one should not be overly skeptical
about the lack of definition here. When defending his notion of structure, an extension of
Lewisian naturalness, Sider (2011, p. 9) says, “Let’s be realistic about the extent and value of
definitions. Philosophical concepts of interest are rarely reductively defined. Still more rarely
does our understanding of such concepts rest on definitions. […] We generally ‘understand’
philosophical concepts to the extent we know what role they play in our thinking.”
Without a straightforward definition for ‘natural’, our task becomes the following: we
must determine whether there is some unique set of properties that satisfies all the roles that
Lewis intended naturalness to satisfy. This is the approach we see in Dorr and Hawthorne’s
(2013) recent paper, “Naturalness.” Dorr and Hawthorne (D & H) consider all of the various
roles Lewis had in mind, and they consider potential problems for the joint satisfaction of these

22

Lewis (1986, p. 61).
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roles. D & H’s approach is virtuous in one crucial respect: by focusing on the theoretical roles
instead of questions involving the term ‘naturalness’ (or ‘natural’) itself, they are able to steer
clear of any potential merely verbal disputes.24 D & H do not take sides in the debates between
what they call ‘naturalness enthusiasts’ and ‘naturalness skeptics’, but I think they certainly
achieve their ultimate goal of bringing “some structure to the terrain.”25
Another methodological point that arises from D & H’s paper concerns the treatment of
the metasemantics of theoretical terms. Our ultimate question is whether there is a unique set of
properties that satisfies the roles Lewis had in mind. If such a set exists, then ‘natural’ has an
extension. But exactly how many roles need to be satisfied in order for us to grant that ‘natural’
refers? Probably not all of them—only a ‘draconian metasemantics’ of theoretical terms, as D &
H say, would require this. But where do we draw the line?26 While we may want to reject the
so-called draconian metasemantics that requires 100% role-satisfaction, an arbitrary cut off of
75% role-satisfaction may be just as objectionable. Surely we will want to be sensitive to the
fact that some roles should have greater weight than others. D & H do not offer an answer to this

I find D & H’s (2013) approach to be very similar Chalmers’s (2011) method of elimination, in
which one eliminates a philosophical term of interest from one’s debate in the hopes of staying
out of a merely verbal dispute. D & H spend a fair amount of time discussing Ramsey sentences
and expanded postulates instead of the method of elimination, but I think they ultimately make
the same point that Chalmers makes.
25
Dorr and Hawthorne (2013, p. 4).
26
Such a problem is reminiscent of Putnam’s (1962) ‘cat’ example, which was also featured in
Kripke (1980): Suppose we originally assumed cats were animals—i.e., that they had similar
biological makeups as other animals. But suppose, upon further investigation, it turned out that
all the things we called ‘cats’ were actually automata. Would we say that there were not any cats
after all? Or would we say that it turned out that cats were automata? This example is analogous
to the question at hand, because the automata still play most of the roles that cats played (e.g., we
have them as pets, they are inferior to dogs, we think the black ones are bad luck, etc.)—but they
no longer play the role of being animals. Is the lack of their playing this role enough to say that
‘cats’ never actually referred to anything?
24
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question in their paper. I will give my own thoughts on this question in Section 5, though these
thoughts come nowhere close to constituting a full-fledged theory of theoretical terms.
3.3 – Naturalness and its roles
Dorr and Hawthorne list eleven different roles that Lewis intended natural properties to
play, and then they consider different combinations of these roles that might be problematic. My
aim in what follows is to more or less extend this approach. I will begin by reproducing their
list. This will give the reader a single location to revisit the roles if necessary.

Supervenience

Everything supervenes on the perfectly natural properties.

Independence

The perfectly natural properties are mutually independent.

Duplication

If some bijection from the parts of x to the parts of y maps x to y and
preserves all the perfectly natural properties, x and y are duplicates.

Non-duplication

If no bijection from the parts of x to the parts of y that maps x to y
preserves all perfectly natural properties, x and y are not duplicates.

Empiricism

The right method for identifying actually-instantiated perfectly
natural properties is empirical.

Simplicity

One property is more natural than another iff the former has a
definition in terms of perfectly natural properties that is simpler than
any definition of the latter in terms of perfectly natural properties.

Laws

The conjunction of all the laws of nature can be expressed simply in
terms of perfectly natural properties.
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Similarity

The more natural a property is, the more it makes for similarity
among things that share it.

Dissimilarity

The more natural a property is, the more it makes for dissimilarity
among things that are divided by it.

Magnetism

The more natural a property is, the easier it is to refer to, ceteris
paribus.

Necessity

Facts about a property’s degree of naturalness are non-contingent.

D & H are thorough in their presentation of this list. They consider a number of interpretations
and glosses of each role.27 For present purposes, I do not wish to get bogged down in the
exegetical project of determining precisely what Lewis may have meant by the above roles. My
reasoning here is twofold. First, D & H are thorough in their presentation of possible
interpretations. Second, most of what I have to say about these roles will apply to any
reasonable precisification of them.
I will give further explanations of some of these roles in Section 4. Still, I should go
ahead and say a number of things about them as they are presented above. Let us begin with
Supervenience. To say that a set of properties A supervenes on a set of properties B is to say that
an object cannot have a change in A-properties without a change in B-properties.28 To consider
an example: an interesting question in aesthetics is whether aesthetic properties (properties like
being beautiful) supervene on microphysical properties. The idea here would be that an object
cannot go from being beautiful to being not-beautiful without undergoing some physical change.

27

See Dorr and Hawthorne (2014, pp. 10-41).
D & H do present a number of versions of Supervenience, but this gloss will serve present
purposes.
28
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Of course, if one thinks beauty is a much more subjective matter and is “in the eye of the
beholder,” then one may be compelled to reject such a supervenience thesis.
As D & H make clear, Supervenience combines with Independence to make the claim
that the perfectly natural properties serve as a minimally complete supervenience base for all
other properties. This is the idea that the perfectly natural properties are the most fundamental
properties. For the sake of simplicity, whenever I wish to refer to the conjunction of
Supervenience and Independence, I will simply speak of ‘Fundamentality’.
The Duplication role, despite its relatively technical definition above, is not difficult to
grasp. Consider what Lewis (1983, p. 355) has to say about it:
“We are familiar with cases of approximate duplication, e.g. when we use copying
machines. And we understand that if these machines were more perfect than they are, the
copies they made would be perfect duplicates of the original. Copy and original would
be alike in size and shape and chemical composition of the ink marks and the paper, alike
in temperature and magnetic alignment and electrostatic charge, alike even in the exact
arrangement of their electrons and quarks. Such duplicates would be exactly alike, we
say. They would match perfectly, they would be qualitatively identical, they would be
indiscernible.”
Lewis’s idea is that two objects that are indiscernible in this way will share all of the same
perfectly natural properties.
Skipping ahead, the Similarity and Dissimilarity roles should be familiar from Section 2.
Lewis thought that the perfectly natural properties were the properties that made for genuine
similarity or resemblance.
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3.4 – Carving the world at its joints
For now, I will leave explanations of some of these roles (in particular, Simplicity,
Magnetism, and Necessity) for Section 4. Before moving on, however, I would like to discuss a
role that was noticeably absent from D & H’s list:

Joint-Carving

The more natural a property is, the better it carves the world at its
joints.

D & H may have had a reason for leaving Joint-Carving out of their list of roles. They may think
the question ‘Does F carve at the joints better than G?’ is simply a variant of the question ‘Is F
more natural than G?’29 But I think it is unlikely that this was their rationale—one can
understand joint-carving independently of naturalness and the above roles. (I will say more
about this shortly.)
Another possibility is that D & H thought joint-carving was simply a matter of
fundamentality (which was already addressed by Supervenience and Independence). Indeed,
some naturalness enthusiasts appear to treat ‘fundamental’ and ‘joint-carving’ as
interchangeable. Sider (2011, p. 5) is explicit about this interchangeability. This usage,
however, might strike one as odd—might there be a property that is perfectly joint-carving but
not fundamental? When Plato’s Socrates talks about carving at the joints in the Phaedrus,30 he
uses the example of dividing the body into two, the right and the left. This is a natural division,
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See Dorr and Hawthorne (2014, p. 8). D & H are right to be careful about these kinds of
questions—ones like ‘Are all properties on par?’ This is because answers to these kinds of
questions tend to include the word ‘natural’, and this takes us back to the original problem.
30
Phaedrus, 265e-266a.
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given the shape of the human body, but it is not clear that it has anything to do with the
fundamental.
3.4.1 – Two types of joint-carving
Perhaps D & H take joint-carving to simply be a matter of fundamentality; they might
even take joint-carving to be the conjunction of all the roles Lewis had in mind. This is possible,
but I think there are two distinct understandings of joint-carving that are related to the other
naturalness roles in unique ways. In this section, I will try to make these distinct understandings
of joint-carving clear, and I will also make the case that both understandings are implicit in the
works of Plato, Lewis, and Sider. The upshot is that we will need to be careful to say which
understanding of joint-carving we are employing whenever we are relating it to other roles.
Let’s begin with the first understanding of joint-carving—I will call it ‘joint-carving1’.
To see what I have in mind here, consider a couple examples from Sider (2011). One example
has to do with the meaning of ‘Europe’. There is a physically prominent line along the Ural
Mountains that could help determine the boundary of Europe. Barring the question of whether
the physically prominent line should determine Europe’s border,31 what does Sider have in mind
when he says that the physically significant line in the Urals is a joint in nature? The takeaway is
that we could use ‘Europe’ to carve at this joint, to have its boundary match up perfectly with the
physically prominent line.
Sider later speaks of “a range of equally joint-carving candidates corresponding to the
‘fuzziness’ in Mars’s spatial boundaries.”32 I presume the fuzziness Sider has in mind here has
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I should note that Sider in fact thinks the physically prominent line along the Urals should not
determine the meaning of ‘Europe’, as it is not joint-carving in the right way. For more on this
point, see Sider (2011, pp. 48-49).
32
Sider (2011, p. 51).
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to do with the fuzziness of Mars’s atmosphere. Barring the question of whether Mars may in fact
have determinate layers of atmosphere, we can at least see what Sider has in mind here. The
question of joint-carving with ‘Mars’ is again a matter of something like physical prominence. If
Mars’s atmosphere were less fuzzy, then the joint between its atmosphere and the space beyond
it would be more prominent.
For another example, consider the name ‘George W. Bush’. We use this name to refer to
George W. Bush, not George-W.-Bush-and-the-electrons-within-a-five-meter-radius-of-him (call
this entity ‘George W. Bush*’). To carve1 at the joints is to use ‘George W. Bush’ in the former
way. It is clear that Lewis sometimes had something like this in mind:
“Compare Bruce with the cat-shaped chunk of miscellaneous and ever-changing matter
that follows him around, always a few steps behind. […] Bruce, unlike the cat-shaped
chunk, has a boundary well demarcated by differences in highly natural properties.
Where Bruce ends, there the density of matter, the relative abundance of chemical
elements,…abruptly change. Not so for the chunk.”33
For a rough analogy, think of how a child in grade school is instructed to “stay within the lines”
as they are coloring a picture, or to “cut along the dashed lines” with their scissors. Our search
for the most joint-carving expressions and corresponding meanings is a similar task. By using
‘George W. Bush’ to refer to George W. Bush*, we are coloring outside the lines, so to speak.
Now that we have a rough idea of joint-carving1, let’s turn to what I will call ‘jointcarving2’. I will intend joint-carving2 to be somewhat of a catchall notion, but I can still say a bit
about what I have in mind. It is common in philosophy to speak of carving at the joints as
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Lewis (1983, p. 372).
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dividing objects into natural kinds.34 We have good reasons to distinguish gold from silver,
tigers from lions. Such a notion of joint-carving has little to do with carving along physically
prominent boundaries; it instead has more to do with grouping objects. To take another example
from Sider, consider a world that contains two electrons and a cow.35 It is at least in some sense
more natural to group the electrons together than it is to group the cow and one of the electrons
together.
I am tempted to say that joint-carving2 is largely a matter of resemblance. That is, when
philosophers talk about joint-carving in relation to dividing the world into natural kinds, they
may have resemblance in mind. However, if one wishes to argue that dividing up the world into
natural kinds is a much more complicated issue that involves more than resemblance, this is
fine—I would intend ‘joint-carving2’ to apply to these more complicated notions as well. The
main feature to keep in mind for joint-carving2 is grouping.
From what I have said so far, one might think that the distinction between joint-carving1
and joint-carving2 is closely tied to a distinction between grammatical categories. Perhaps
singular terms (like names and descriptions) are varyingly joint-carving1, while general terms
and predicates (which usually have extensions with more than one member) are varyingly jointcarving2.
This is actually not what I have in mind. Predicates and properties can be joint-carving1,
and there is also a sense (albeit a trivial one) in which singular terms can be joint-carving2. The
most straightforward case of properties that are joint-carving1 are haecceities, properties of being
particular entities. For example, the property being George W. Bush is an haecceity, and it
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Indeed, such an understanding of joint-carving is present in contemporary literature. See, for
instance, Campbell, O’Rourke, and Slater (2011).
35
Sider (2011, p. 1).
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arguably carves1 at the joints in much the same way that the name ‘George W. Bush’ carves at
the joints.
Because haecceities only admit of one object in their extensions, it is difficult to see how
they might carve2 at the joints. After all, how is being George W. Bush grouping any objects
together in the way that being a tiger groups all of the tigers together? The answer is not
immediately clear. But if joint-carving2 is a matter of resemblance, and if resemblance is a
reflexive relation, then perhaps haecceities will be trivially joint-carving2. After all, all objects
resemble themselves. It is in this sense that we may also say that singular terms are trivially
joint-carving2.
But it is not just haecceitic properties that can carve1 at the joints. Other properties will
be able to as well. Consider, for instance, the property being a tiger. When using the predicate
‘is a tiger’, we could refer to being a tiger minus its left hind foot. If we used ‘is a tiger’ in such
a way, all of the entities in its extension would genuinely resemble one another, but something is
obviously off here—we should be including the left hind foot for each tiger. Including the left
hind foot, though, is a matter of joint-carving1, not joint-carving2. (And oddly enough, leaving
out the foot makes for more resemblance, which implies that being a tiger minus its left hind foot
is more joint-carving2 than being a tiger.)
3.4.2 – Interesting cases and other potential issues
Sometimes it will be difficult to tell which understanding of joint-carving is involved in a
particular case. Consider, for example, Sider’s red-blue world. Sider has us imagine a world
that is filled entirely with red and blue fluid.
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Figure 1 – Sider’s red-blue world36
How should we “carve up” such a world? We could do it in a number of ways, but to carve this
world at its joints, we would have to carve along the boundary between the red fluid and the blue
fluid, like this:

Figure 2 – Carving the red-blue world at its joints
In Figure 2, our carving is represented by the dashed line, and the shaded areas represent the
extensions of being red and being blue. The area to the left of the dashed line is red, and the area
to the right is blue. But consider another possible carving:

36

The figures I use here are very similar to those featured the first chapter of Sider (2011).
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Figure 3 – A slightly-off carving of the red-blue world
This is indeed a way of carving up the red-blue world. As Sider says, we could talk about the
area left of the dashed line in Figure 3 as having the property being bred, and the area to the right
of the line as being rue. And if we pointed to some area left of the line as said that it was bred,
we would be speaking truthfully. But it is still clear that being bred and being rue do not carve
at the joints.
If being bred and being rue do not carve perfectly at the joints, then in what sense of
joint-carving have they failed? I think this is an interesting case. There is a sense in which the
line in Figure 2 carves1 the red-blue world at its joints, because it carves along the physically
prominent line. There is another sense in which the line in Figure 2 carves2 at the joints, because
it divides the fluids into different categories.37
Putting aside overlap cases (where both senses of joint-carving are involved), there may
be other problems for these understandings of joint-carving. For example, it is common to talk
of carving the mind at its joints.38 Philosophers of mind often ask questions like ‘Is there a joint
between cognition and perception?’ or ‘Is there a joint between belief and the imagination?’ In
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We might even say here that the physically prominent line here is determined by facts about
similarity.
38
See Lyons (2001).
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much the same spirit Plato considered, in Book IV of the Republic, whether the soul was
divisible into three distinct parts.
If joint-carving1 is a matter of “coloring inside the lines” and looking for physically
prominent features, then it is not easy to see how one could carve1 at the mental. And if jointcarving2 is a matter of resemblance, then it is at least more plausible that one could carve2 the
mind at its joints. We commonly speak of some thoughts resembling others.
Given the examples and potential issues we have covered, I will now try to give a more
formal characterization of each type of joint-carving. Perhaps one could give much more precise
definitions of each, but the hope is that these characterizations will be sufficient for now.

Joint-Carving1: To carve1 the world at its joints, one must be worried about carving
around all and only the right parts of a single object (or of multiple objects in a set).

Joint-Carving2: To carve2 the world at its joints, one must be worried about grouping
objects in a natural way, according to resemblance or some other means.

These characterizations are admittedly vague, but now we can consider, for example, how one
might carve the mind at its joints. If we introduce a notion like functional resemblance, it will be
natural to group together certain mental states and to divide them from others. If, for instance,
one thinks some mental states (like beliefs) function to aim at the truth, while others (like
imagination) do not function in this way, then there will be more grounds for saying there is a
joint between beliefs and imaginative states. This sounds like joint-carving2.
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Not only is it important that we group mental states together in the right way; it is also
important that we not leave out the right parts or add the wrong parts. If, for example, the mental
states we call ‘beliefs’ really do function to aim at the truth, then we will want to include that as
a feature of theirs. If they do not have this function, then we will not want to include it. This
might be a matter of joint-carving1.
Finally, I want to add a couple more points about these two understandings of jointcarving. The first point is that both understandings will admit of degrees in straightforward
ways. An expression’s degree of joint-carving1 will be directly related to the amount of an
object it rightfully includes. Consider the following candidate meanings for the predicate ‘is a
tiger’: being a tiger, being a tiger minus its left hind foot, being a tiger minus its left hind leg,
being a tiger minus all four legs, being a tiger plus all of the electrons within a five mile radius.
I have arranged this list according to level of joint-carving1. Being a tiger is perfectly jointcarving1—it includes all and only the right area of tigers. Being a tiger minus its left hind foot
includes less area than it should, but it includes more of the right area than the two properties that
follow it. Being a tiger plus all of the electrons within a five mile radius includes all of the area
it should, but it also includes far too much—so it is an extremely poor carving. If joint-carving2
is something like resemblance, then degree of joint-carving2 will be a matter of how much the
objects in a given group resemble one another. This means that even though being a tiger
carves1 perfectly at the joints, it does not carve2 perfectly. There is still a high level of
resemblance between all tigers, so being a tiger is fairly joint-carving2. And being a tiger is
more joint-carving2 than being a tiger or a lion. And being a tiger or a lion is more jointcarving2 than being a tiger or the Empire State building.
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The second point I wish to make this. One might argue that one of these understandings
of joint-carving—more likely joint-carving2—is more orthodox, or that it is more likely what
Plato had in mind in the Phaedrus. I do not think such an argument is convincing. I do think
Plato was certainly interested in joint-carving2; but when he speaks of dividing the body up into a
right half and a left half, it is at least conceivable that he had something like joint-carving1 in
mind. This is an interesting historical question, but I do not intend to focus on it here. Even if
Plato did not have joint-carving1 in mind, I believe that, given the examples I have shown above,
joint-carving1 is implicit in the work of Sider and Lewis. Joint-carving1 and joint-carving2 will
have different relations to the other naturalness roles, so it is an important distinction to make.
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Section 4: Problems for Natural Properties
There are a number of problems for naturalness as it is typically understood. In this
section, I will argue that there are some sets of roles which cannot be jointly-satisfied by any
property. Given that naturalness is to be understood in terms of these roles, these arguments then
amount to skeptical arguments against naturalness.
4.1 – Fundamentality + Necessity + Joint-Carving
I see a problem with a property’s satisfying the roles of Fundamentality, Necessity, and
Joint-Carving. Recall that Fundamentality is the claim that the perfectly natural properties serve
as a minimally complete supervenience base. Necessity is the claim that a property’s degree of
naturalness is non-contingent. And Joint-Carving is the claim that a property’s degree of
naturalness corresponds to its level of joint-carving.
Keeping all of these roles in mind, consider an example. Consider the actual world,
where electrons are fundamental—they are mereological simples that have no proper parts.
Perhaps one day we will discover this to be untrue, but let us stipulate that this is the case for
now. So let us stipulate that being an electron is fundamental. In contrast, being an atom is not
fundamental, as atoms are composed of sub-atomic particles like protons, neutrons, and
electrons. Being an atom is very close to being fundamental, but it is not quite there.
Now consider a nearby possible world where electrons do have proper parts: suppose
these entities can be broken down into halves. Suppose further that this world is the same as the
actual world in all other respects.39 In such a world, we might say that being an electron is not
fundamental, but being the right half of an electron is. Another thing is likely, too: being an
electron is carving1 at the same joints in both worlds; in this nearby possible world, however,
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Dorr and Hawthorne (2014, pp. 33-34) consider a very similar example in a footnote.
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there are simply more joints to carve at. Recall that joint-carving1 is a matter of including
precisely the right amount of an object in an extension. To make such a carving, we will be
moving around the same lines in each world.

Figure 5 – Electrons in the actual world and a nearby possible world
Here we have a situation where a single property—being an electron—has different levels of
fundamentality in different worlds, but where it maintains its level of joint-carving1. Being an
electron carves right along the circles in Figure 5; it does not go outside of the lines, so to speak.
But Necessity requires that a property’s degree of naturalness be the same in all possible worlds,
so a perfectly natural property cannot be fundamental in one world and non-fundamental in
another. Thus, we have found an important property that cannot satisfy all of these roles at once.
One might reply to this scenario by saying that the property of being an electron is not
really instantiated at the nearby possible world—that the things that I am calling ‘electrons’ in
this nearby possible world are not even electrons. Perhaps all there is in this nearby possible
world is being an electron*. This type of reply, as D & H note, could be motivated by a belief in
the necessary a posteriori.
A proposition is necessarily true iff it is true in all possible worlds. A proposition is a
posteriori iff it is justified by experience. Traditionally, philosophers (going back at least as far
as Hume) treated necessary truths (like ‘All bachelors are male’) as a priori, justified
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independently of experience. However, Kripke (1980) famously argued that there were some a
posteriori necessities, some truths that featured natural kind terms. Kripke thought that once we
discover the referent of a natural kind term—like ‘water’, whose referent is H2O—that term
rigidly designates that referent. In other words, natural kind terms refer to the same thing in all
possible worlds. It follows that a posteriori identities like ‘Water is H2O’ are true in all possible
worlds. Similarly, one might think that ‘electron’ rigidly designates the kind of electron we see
in the actual world, the kind that is presumably indivisible.
Perhaps we must make a distinction between being an electron and being an electron*. I
am actually happy to grant this point. If we have Kripke-like scruples here and want to say that
there are no electrons at this nearby world, this is fine; but we are still left with a problem. The
problem arises from the assumption that fundamentality is closely tied to joint-carving. Even if
we want to say that there is a distinction between being an electron and being an electron*, I will
maintain that these two properties carve1 at the exact same joints in each world. Looking back at
Figure 4, both properties carve a perfect circle along the outside of the particles. At the same
time, we should all agree that being an electron* is not fundamental, but being an electron is.
This allows us to hang on to Necessity, if we so choose, but it is now clear fundamentality and
level of joint-carving1 come apart.
4.2 – Simplicity + Similarity + Joint-Carving
Now consider another set of roles: Simplicity, Similarity, and Joint-Carving. Simplicity
is the claim that the naturalness of a property is determined by the length of its definition in a
perfectly natural language (a language consisting of only perfectly natural predicates). Although
‘is grue’ is not (from a linguistic perspective, at least) prima facie more disjunctive than ‘is blue’,
the definition of ‘is grue’ in terms of perfectly natural properties is plausibly longer than the
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definition of ‘is blue’. This is because ‘is grue’ (in Goodman’s (1955) sense) applies to “all
things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue.”
So we can say that ‘is blue’ is more natural than ‘is grue’.
As Sider notes, however, this type of approach to comparative naturalness will encounter
some difficulties. First, it treats all infinitely-disjunctive definitions as equally natural. Sider’s
reply to this difficulty is that many of the definitions we are interested in will not be infinite
definitions.40
Even if it is true that most definitions we need will not be infinite, there is a remaining
worry. It is not clear that the number of disjuncts in a perfectly natural language corresponds to
naturalness or level of joint-carving. Consider these two disjunctive properties: being red or
orange and being red or blue. Similarity, recall, is the claim that the more natural a property is,
the more it makes for similarity amongst the things it applies to. The fact that ‘is blue’ is more
natural than ‘is grue’ has something to do with the fact that the members of the extension of ‘is
blue’ more closely resemble one another than those of ‘is grue’. But what about the extensions
of being red or orange and being red or blue? The members of the extension of being red or
orange resemble one another more than those of being red or blue. If Lewis is right about
comparative naturalness, though, we should expect the disjunctive definition of being red or
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See Sider (2011, p. 130).
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orange to be shorter than the definition of being red or blue. But their definitions do not differ in
length—both are equally long disjunctions of equally joint-carving properties.41 42
It is clear that Sider may have this type of problem in mind when he says that “A further
worry about the Lewisian approach is that mere length of definitions is an inadequate
measure.”43 Interestingly, Sider does suggest an alternative strategy that is in the spirit of
Lewis’s definitional strategy. If our perfectly natural language is the first-order predicate
calculus, and we are only allowing perfectly natural predicates into our language, then we could
evaluate definitions in prenex disjunctive normal form; that way we could easily determine
exactly how long each definition was.44 Additionally, we could come up with new strategies for
evaluating various Boolean compounds of perfectly natural predicates. One that Sider mentions:
“The number of disjuncts might, for instance, be taken to count against the definition more than
the average number of conjuncts per disjuncts.”45 After all, disjunctions of perfectly natural
properties are less natural than conjunctions of perfectly natural properties.46 We can justify this
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These colors (red, blue, and orange) are determinables. There are many ways for an object to
be red—it can be scarlet red, mahogany red, or even something as specific as Coca-Cola red.
See Funkhouser (2006, pp. 548-549). This means that being red does not make for perfect
similarity with regard to color. That said, we might consider a similar example to the one above:
instead of being red or orange, we could take the disjunctions of all the super-determinate shades
of red and orange. In such a case, each disjunct would do a better job of making for
resemblance, and it would be just as problematic for Lewis.
42
Here is another possible example: compare being an electron or a cow with being an electron
or a proton. The latter does a better on making for resemblance, yet we might expect these
properties to be equally simple.
43
Sider (2011, p. 131).
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The idea here is that once we have defined a property in a perfectly natural language, we can
then ensure that we are comparing the definitions in the fairest way. Prenex disjunctive normal
form has all of the quantifiers on the left, with the predicates and variables on the right. Since all
first-order logic sentences can be converted to this form, this gives us a way to compare
definitions fairly.
45
Sider (2011, p. 131).
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This point ultimately derives from Armstrong (1978).
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by thinking in terms of resemblance. Conjunctive properties make for genuine resemblance in at
least some respect, while disjunctive properties do not guarantee this.
But even if we can come up with a better strategy (like the one we have just considered)
for evaluating definitions in a perfectly natural language, this is unlikely to solve the problem
raised by the red-or-orange/red-or-blue example. That is, being red or orange appears to be
more natural than being red or blue, but it is not clear that being red or orange will have a
shorter definition than being red or blue in Lewis’s perfectly natural language. It does not really
matter if we devise a strategy for weighting disjunctions differently than conjunctions if we have
no independent reason for thinking that being red or orange will have a shorter definition; after
all, both properties are disjunctions of equally-natural, equally-joint-carving colors.
I think this problem will generalize, and it can be pressed in at least a couple ways. First,
we can come up with a term that is intuitively more natural than another but for which we have
no independent reason to think that its definition will be shorter (or otherwise simpler). The redor-orange/red-or-blue example would fall into this category. Second, we can come up with
properties that we might expect to be simpler but that are treated as equally natural or jointcarving. Sider, for instance, claims that being an unmarried male and being an unmarried male
eligible for marriage carve at the joints equally well. But it is pretty plausible that being an
unmarried male eligible for marriage would have a longer definition in Lewis’s perfectly natural
language than being an unmarried male. Being an unmarried male eligible form marriage is
adding more constraints on what it is to be a bachelor. It is not as simple.
In response to the example I have just mentioned, one might worry that we are falling
prey to the mistake we discussed at the beginning of Section 3: perhaps our reason for claiming
that being an unmarried male eligible for marriage would have a longer definition just because it
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takes more words than being an unmarried male to specify the property. It is true that the way
we specify properties in English is merely a contingency, so we must address this kind of worry.
Let’s use ‘being F’ to refer to the same property as being an unmarried male, and let’s use
‘being G’ to refer to the same property as being an unmarried male eligible for marriage. Even
after we evened things out, so to speak, it is still plausible that being G will have a longer
definition in a perfectly natural language.
4.3 – Reference magnetism
Reference magnetism is a metasemantic notion. What distinguishes a metasemantic
notion from a merely semantic notion? Generally speaking, semantics is concerned with what
our words mean; metasemantics, we might say, is concerned with questions about semantics.
One who is interested in metasemantics might ask questions like this: What makes for a good
semantic theory? What is the nature of reference? What is it that makes the words we use have
meaning?47 Consider this last question. When philosophers ask this question, they are interested
in what ties our words to things in the world. In other words, they are interested in the “semantic
glue” that sticks words to their referents.
Some philosophers have suggested (in various ways) that it may not be as easy as it looks
to get an answer to this question. Following Wittgenstein, Kripke (1982) famously pointed out
that our past usage of ‘plus’ may not ensure that we mean plus (our normal understanding of the
addition function) rather than quus (a function that works like normal addition for numbers under
57, but which outputs ‘5’ otherwise). This type of problem generalizes to nonmathematical
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This distinction is closely related to the distinction between a semantic theory and a
foundational theory of meaning. For more on the distinction, see Speaks (2014). There,
reference magnetism is treated as a criterion of a foundational theory of meaning. Also see
Hawthorne (2007, p. 430), where he speaks of a ‘foundational account of intentionality’.
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examples; skeptical worries like this make the search for semantic glue even more important and
interesting.
In Section 3.2 of Writing the Book of the World, Sider surveys a number of metasemantic
theories that attempt to provide semantic glue; but for many of them, as he says, “the glue
doesn’t seem to be sticky enough.” One such theory is a simple sort of descriptivism, and it
works like this: for a given word, there is a set of definitional sentences S that contain that word.
According to this sort of descriptivism, a satisfactory interpretation of the meaning of a word
involves making all of the sentences in S true. The problem for such a theory is that we can
construct interpretations which make all of the sentences in S turn out true, but which also make
intuitively false sentences come out true, too.
Let’s consider an example. Here is an intuitively false sentence featuring ‘bachelor’:
‘All bachelors are millionaires’. We can assign semantic values that make this sentence true.
First, we can assign the set of gold watches to ‘bachelor’. Second, we can assign the set of
timepieces to ‘are millionaires’. Since it is true that all gold watches are timepieces, we have
made our intuitively false sentence come out true.
But what about the definitional sentences for ‘bachelor’ that would be in S? It does not
take much work to make these come out true, too. Take ‘All bachelors are male’, for instance.
If we assign the set of watches to ‘are male’, then ‘All bachelors are male’ will turn out true
because all gold watches are watches. And we could continue to tweak our interpretations so as
to make all of the definitional sentences in S true.
Given that this simple sort of descriptivism fails, we are going to need a different
metasemantic theory. The main failing of the descriptivist account was that it allowed us to
assign bizarre semantic values to words. An improved theory should keep this from happening.
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That is what Lewis’s theory aims to do. Good interpretations, on Lewis’s account, involve the
assignment of natural meanings to words, allowing us to eliminate the bizarre semantic values.48
Natural meanings serve as reference magnets, pulling words and their referents towards one
another.
Importantly, Lewis is not claiming that we cannot refer to unnatural properties. We can
refer to unnatural properties whenever we like, if that is what we intend to do. For this reason,
Dorr and Hawthorne’s specification of reference magnetism in terms of ‘easiness’ of reference is
perhaps not ideal; ‘eligibility’ is the better term to use. Lewis’s point is that, generally speaking,
we ought to interpret speakers as referring to natural semantic values. This is also why reference
magnetism is typically not taken to be full-fledged metasemantic theory; rather, it is typically
viewed as an additional constraint on more robust theories. So, for example, one might view
reference magnetism as an additional constraint on the simple descriptivist theory above, or one
might add it to a causal theory.49
It is important to note that reference magnetism is an externalist constraint on reference.
In the philosophy of language, externalism is the idea that meaning is at least partly determined
by features in our environment—or, as Putnam phrased it, meanings just “ain’t in the head.” In
the latter half of the twentieth century, many philosophers (such as Putnam, Kripke, Burge, and
Lewis50) defended externalism.

48

Importantly, other constraints—e.g., a causal constraint—can eliminate (many but not all)
bizarre semantic values, too. I say more on this later.
49
Both of these options are considered in detail in Sider (2011).
50
See Putnam (1975), Kripke (1980), and, more recently, Burge (2010).
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Lewis himself favors another view, an “eligibility plus charity” view.51 On such a view,
a good interpretation is one that “strikes the best balance” between eligibility and charity.
Eligibility is a matter of interpreting predicates to pick out more natural properties. Charity is a
matter of interpreting a speaker’s statements so that they come out to be true.
To see why eligibility on its own is not enough, consider another example. It is fairly
well known that ‘jade’ is now typically used to refer to two different elements, nephrite and
jadeite. Suppose I pick up a piece of jadeite and I say ‘This rock is jade’. What makes it the
case that I am attributing the property being either nephrite or jadeite instead of simply being
nephrite? If one looks only to eligibility, one might interpret me as meaning being nephrite as
this property is presumably more natural than the disjunctive being either nephrite or jadeite.
But since I am intending to use the disjunctive property here, something has gone wrong here. If
the rock I am referring to is actually jadeite, then the eligibility-only theory interprets my
utterance as false. If one adds a constraint of charity, however, one will also interpret my
utterances as (for the most part) being true. The charity constraint would thereby eliminate being
nephrite as a possible semantic value in this situation.
There will be other cases, however, where eligibility is a deciding factor. In a TwinEarth-style example,52 charity may not determine whether ‘water’ refers to the colorless liquid
found in lakes and streams or H2O. In such a case, eligibility would point to the latter candidate.

See Lewis (1984, pp. 227-228). And as Dorr and Hawthorne (2014, p. 28) make clear: “[F]or
Lewis, this was just a toy theory. In his considered view, the primary role for naturalness is in
the theory of mental content, although naturalness does play a subsidiary role in the story about
how semantic facts supervene on mental ones…” Dorr and Hawthorne go on to say much more
about Lewis’s theory of mental content.
52
See Putnam (1975).
51
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4.3.1 – Magnetism + Similarity
Now that we have a picture of Lewis’s metasemantic theory, let’s consider how the role
of Magnetism might fit in with others. Let’s begin with Similarity.
The conjunction of Magnetism and Similarity amounts to the claim that a property’s
eligibility for reference corresponds to level of similarity (or resemblance) amongst the members
of the property’s extension. Because being blue does a better job at making for similarity than
being blue or green, the former property is a better candidate for reference. Also consider TwinEarth-style examples. Does ‘water’ refer to the colorless liquid found in lakes and streams, or
does it refer to H2O? Because H2O makes for more resemblance, it is a better candidate for
reference.
Magnetism and Similarity will lead us in the right direction in some cases, but there still
exist problematic cases. Being a tiger does reasonably well on making for similarity. The things
that have this property are pretty similar, though there will of course be differences: most
notably, differences in sex and size. Being a lion does just as well in terms of similarity. The
disjunction of these two properties being either a tiger or a lion does a little worse on similarity,
though we can of course imagine properties that would do even worse. It is plausible that being
a tiger is a better semantic candidate that being either a tiger or a lion. But consider another
property. Suppose we know a lion named ‘Rex’—and so there is a corresponding property being
Rex the lion. This property does much better than being a lion on similarity, as there is only one
member of its extension. Now consider two disjunctive properties: being either a tiger or a lion
and being either a tiger or Rex the lion. Is the latter property a more eligible semantic
candidate? Though it does better in making for similarity, this is unlikely.54

54

It is likely that charity or use would eliminate these candidates in most contexts.
38

Though I have largely been focusing on the meanings of predicates, it is worth noting that
the meanings of singular terms are not straightforwardly determined by similarity. We may, of
course, say that any object is similar to itself, but there is no way for us to compare degrees of
similarity that different candidates make for. For example, suppose our usage of ‘Bob’ does not
favor Bob over Bob-plus-the-atoms-within-a-half-centimeter-from-Bob. Either candidate
trivially makes for perfect resemblance, but Bob does better than Bob-plus-the-atoms-within-ahalf-centimeter-from-Bob on joint-carving1. Resemblance is not doing any work here.
4.3.2 – Magnetism and other roles
Now let us turn to the question of how Magnetism fits in with other naturalness roles.
Let’s start by considering Magnetism and Joint-Carving. The conjunction of Magnetism and
Joint-Carving amounts to the claim that a property’s eligibility for reference corresponds to its
level of joint-carving.
Recall our distinction between joint-carving1 and joint-carving2. Roughly speaking, jointcarving1 is a matter of “coloring inside the lines.” Joint-carving2, on the other hand, is a matter
of dividing natural kinds, which may just be a matter of similarity (or resemblance).
Philosophers have tended to conflate joint-carving1 and joint-carving2; importantly,
however, these notions play interestingly distinct roles in conjunction with Magnetism. First
consider joint-carving1. In this sense, carving at the joints rules out bizarre semantic candidates
like being George W. Bush and all the electrons within 5 cm of George W. Bush. Now consider
joint-carving2. Because joint-carving2 has more to do with resemblance, carving at the joints in
this sense will help eliminate a different kind of bizarre semantic value—like being either blue
or a tiger.
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It is clear that both types of joint-carving can help us eliminate bizarre semantic values,
but can a set of properties play both of these joint-carving roles at once? Yes—to an extent. The
problem is that while both joint-carving1 and joint-carving2 allow for degrees of joint-carving,
different properties will have different levels of joint-carving, depending on which version we
are looking at. For example, being an atom is a reasonably joint-carving2, but of course not all
atoms look alike. A hydrogen atom is different from a helium atom. If we look to jointcarving1, however, being an atom carves perfectly at the joints, even though not all atoms are
intrinsic duplicates.
Recall, too, the connections between the two types of joint-carving and other roles. Jointcarving2 may have some connection to fundamentality. For any fundamental particle, there will
be a property, being that kind of fundamental particle, that makes for perfect genuine similarity.
Being an electron may be such a property. But notice, too, that joint-carving1 is not so closely
tied to the fundamental. Just as being an atom can carve1 perfectly at the joints, so too can a
property like being a tiger (which does not carve2 perfectly at the joints).
Though the properties that carve1 at the joints do not need to be fundamental properties
themselves, joint-carving1 is still connected to fundamentality in a more derivative way. This is
because the joints, and thus the demarcations, between objects are ultimately determined by
fundamental entities. And this actually leads to some interesting questions about joint-carving1:
how are we to “stay inside the lines” at the fundamental level? Here is how I see it working:
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Figure 5 – Joint-carving1 at the fundamental level
Though I think Figure 5 shows the most straightforward way to carve at the fundamental, I am in
principle open to another method if it has non-trivial implications.
To summarize: both versions of joint-carving allow us to eliminate a different kind of
bizarre semantic value. But both understandings of joint-carving are at odds with other roles.
The most joint-carving1 properties will not necessarily be the most fundamental properties, and a
property’s level of joint-carving2 will not necessarily correspond to its level of simplicity in a
perfectly natural language.
4.4 – Substantivity and the merely verbal
Though Lewis did not connect natural properties to substantivity, Ted Sider has argued
that there is a connection.
4.4.1 – Introduction to substantivity
Some progress is made in philosophy when we discover that a dispute we are engaged in
is pointless—we figure out that we need not waste our time on it anymore. One way a dispute
can be pointless is if it is nonsubstantive—roughly, if it is dispute merely about the meanings of
words rather than the world. When a dispute is merely verbal, it’s easy to get the feeling that it is
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pointless; if we would just get clear on the meanings of terms, the dispute would evaporate.55 A
debate about whether the Pope is a bachelor might just involve a disagreement about the
meaning of ‘is a bachelor’. To borrow Sider’s example, the parties to this dispute might disagree
about whether ‘is a bachelor’ means being an unmarried male or being an unmarried male who
is eligible for marriage. In such a situation it is likely that the root of the disagreement is merely
verbal, not substantive.56 If we are interested in identifying these types of disputes (and it is not
always easy), then it would be helpful to have a good understanding of what makes for a
substantive or nonsubstantive dispute.57
Sider approaches the problem of substantivity in terms of structure. When asking
whether a given question or claim is substantive, we should look to the candidate meanings of all
of the constituent expressions. Consider the question of whether online video gaming is a sport.
The predicate ‘is a sport’ has a number of candidate meanings: being an outdoor recreational
competition, being a recreational competition that involves teams, etc. Whether online gaming
is a sport seems to be a question of which of these candidate meanings we go with, not a question
about how the world is.
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As Chalmers (2011) makes clear, not all verbal disputes are pointless. Often we care deeply
about the answers to nonsubstantive questions. For example, we care about the judicial
interpretation of the term ‘person’.
56
We can imagine, however, an alternative context in which the question of whether the Pope is
a bachelor is intuitively substantive. If, for instance, two parties agree that the meaning of ‘is a
bachelor’ is being an unmarried male who is eligible for marriage, but one of the parties is just
unfamiliar with the commitments of the papacy or does not know who the Pope is, then the
question may turn out to be substantive.
57
Philosophers often use ‘substantive’ or ‘merely verbal’ to modify different things—e.g.,
disputes, claims, or questions. Chalmers (2011) speaks mostly in terms of disputes. Sider
usually speaks in terms of claims or questions, but he is careful to note that these notions are
closely related. See Sider (2011, pp. 47-48).
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One might naturally ask what it takes for a particular meaning to count as a semantic
candidate. Sider defines candidatehood counterfactually: “If a linguistic community, roughly in
our circumstances, could have used E to mean m without seeming ‘semantically alien’—could
have used E to reach ‘the same semantic goal’ as we use E to reach, albeit perhaps by a different
route—then m is a candidate for E.”58 I would submit that neither of the meanings I have just
considered for ‘is a sport’ is semantically alien in Sider’s sense. In this instance, our semantic
goal might just be to determine whether online gaming highlights should be featured on
SportsCenter (a program which, for the sake of argument, covers all and only sports). Both of
these meanings will get the job done.
So where does naturalness come into Sider’s account of substantivity? Here is one of the
answers that he considers:
“…a nonsubstantive question is one containing an expression E whose candidates are
such that i) each opposing view about the question comes out true on some candidate;
and ii) no candidate carves at the joints in the right way for E better than the rest. A
candidate c1 carves better ‘in the right way for E’ than another candidate c2, to a first
approximation anyway, iff E is a theoretical term, c1 satisfies enough of the core theory
associated with E, and c1 carves better than does c2.”59
One might think that Sider’s understanding of substantivity admits of degrees. The distinction
between the substantive and nonsubstantive might strike one as familiar. It appears to be closely
related to other historical divisions—for example, to Hume’s distinction between relations of
ideas and matters of fact, or to Kant’s distinction between the analytic and synthetic. If the
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Sider (2011, p. 50).
Sider (2011, p. 49).
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substantive-nonsubstantive distinction is to be understood in the way I have described above, one
might think that this suggests a lack of sharp divide between substantive and nonsubstantive
claims. Thus, this account of substantivity might be used to motivate a sort of Quinean picture, a
picture that blurs the boundaries between the substantive and nonsubstantive.60
4.4.2 – Substantivity + Joint-Carving
Though Sider is connecting joint-carving to substantivity, it would not be quite right to
say that he thinks the substantivity of a question directly corresponds to the joint-carving scores
of the question’s constituent expressions. But there is still a connection, as we have seen above.
And if there is supposed to be this connection, we must yet again be clear on what we mean by
‘joint-carving’.
In some places, Sider appears to have joint-carving2 in mind when he is talking about
substantivity. This is the case when he speaks of substantivity and its relation to the special
sciences, those sciences other than fundamental physics:
“…I said earlier that being cast in perfectly joint-carving terms normally suffices for
substantivity. But being cast in highly albeit not perfectly joint-carving terms—a
common occurrence in the special sciences—also normally suffices for substantivity.
Except for questions that strain the boundaries of taxonomy (a relatively uncommon
occurrence), special-science questions normally fall into one of the following two
categories: i) each expression has a candidate meaning that carves far better than all
other candidates; or ii) each expression has a range of candidates that carve far better than
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See Quine (1951).
44

do other candidates not in the range, and the question’s answer is insensitive to choices of
candidates within those ranges. In either case, the question is substantive.”61
If Sider has joint-carving2 in mind, however, let us consider whether this is plausible. A property
like being a tiger carves2 reasonably well, as the members of its extension resemble one another
to a high degree. But recall the property we considered in 4.3.1—being a tiger or Rex the lion.
Such a property is only slightly less joint-carving2 than being a tiger. And now a question like
‘Do some tigers have manes?’ will come out as nonsubstantive when, intuitively, it is
substantive. This is because neither candidate meaning, as Sider’s definition calls for, carving
far better than the other. So understanding substantivity in terms of joint-carving2 is
problematic.
One might say that being a tiger in fact is carving much better than being a tiger or Rex
the lion. After all, letting Rex into this group is to let in a completely new animal with different
a different evolutionary history, DNA, etc. I might grant this point if pressed, but perhaps this
shows the need for further analysis of the ‘carves far better than’ segment of Sider’s definition.
What about joint-carving1—is it a more plausible guide to substantivity? Unlikely.
Being a tiger and being a tiger or Rex the lion are equally joint-carving1, because neither
property colors outside the lines, so to speak. The objects that each property applies to will be
perfectly carved around—Rex’s tail, for instance, is not left out of the extension of being a tiger
or Rex the lion. Thus, joint-carving1 will not be a good guide to substantivity, at least in the way
Sider may have in mind.
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Sider (2011, p. 48).
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Because both understandings of joint-carving have these problems, I think it is unlikely
substantivity can be understood in terms of joint-carving. But perhaps a more refined notion of
joint-carving could do the work Sider would like it to do.
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Section 5: Conclusion
In Section 3.2, I briefly discussed an interesting point that Dorr and Hawthorne make
about the metasemantics of theoretical terms. Suppose one has an incredibly strict (or
“draconian”) metasemantics of theoretical terms: a theoretical term T has a nonempty extension
only if some entity satisfies all of the theoretical roles associated with T. If my worries in
Section 4 are warranted, then such a metasemantics would leave ‘natural’ without an extension.
And this would leave us with good reason to be skeptical of Lewisian naturalness. But this
metasemantics is probably too strict.
Still, I think that even a more reasonable metasemantics may prevent ‘natural’ from
referring. A more reasonable metasemantics might distinguish between roles that are more- and
less-central to a given notion. For Lewisian naturalness, distinguishing between more- and lesscentral roles is no simple task—it is a task that requires a considerable amount of exegetical
work. But if we look at Dorr and Hawthorne’s list, we could at least start this project.
Consider, first, a role like Empiricism. Empiricism is less of an explanatory role and
more of just a conceptual or epistemic role. This makes some difference. If it turned out that
some perfectly natural properties were discoverable by a priori means, but they could still do the
same explanatory work, then I see no reason to deny the existence of natural properties in that
case. This is not to say that all mere conceptual roles will be less central than explanatory roles,
but this seems to be the case with a role like Empiricism.
The upshot of Section 4.1 was that we may be forced to drop Fundamentality, Necessity,
or Joint-Carving, or hold that none of these always obtains. Again, I do not think dropping
Necessity would be a major concession on the naturalness enthusiast’s part. But as I stressed in
4.1, dropping necessity will not be enough: it is still the case that level of fundamentality does
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not correspond to level of joint-carving. Because of this, I believe a naturalness enthusiast may
even be required to drop either Fundamentality or Joint-Carving.
But even if the naturalness enthusiast chooses to drop Fundamentality, Dorr and
Hawthorne offer some compelling evidence that Lewis may have intended it to be a central role
for naturalness. As they argue, “In ‘New Work’, the main focus is on a claim of Nonsupervenience: no perfectly natural property is such that the facts about it supervene on the facts
about all the other perfectly natural properties. In conjunction with Supervenience, this is
equivalent to the claim that the perfectly natural properties constitute a minimal supervenience
base for everything…”63
If Fundamentality is a central role, this leaves open the option of dropping Joint-Carving.
But this is probably not a good option for the naturalness enthusiast, as it is plausible that Lewis
intended Joint-Carving to be an equally central role. Consider, for instance, what he says in
“New Work for a Theory of Universals”: “Properties carve reality at the joints—and everywhere
else as well” and, later, “…one thing that makes for the naturalness of a property is that it is a
property belonging exclusively to well-demarcated things.”64
Given the considerations of 4.1, it appears the naturalness enthusiast is forced to drop a
central role—either Fundamentality or Joint-Carving. And given even a somewhat lax
metasemantics, one that does not require complete role-satisfaction, we have good reason to say
that there are no such things as natural properties.
If one is not convinced by 4.1, then we can turn to Section 4.2, where I considered the
roles of Simplicity, Similarity, and (again) Joint-Carving. As we saw in that section, Simplicity
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Dorr and Hawthorne (2014, p. 13).
Lewis (1983, pp. 346, 373).
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can be explicated in a number of ways: we can come up with different methods for evaluating
the simplicity of a definition in a perfectly natural language. If Lewis’s length of definition
approach could be replaced by a more plausible method of evaluation, then this replacement
would be close enough to the Simplicity role he had in mind. Even so, I argued in 4.2 that any
reasonable method of evaluation of definitional simplicity will run into problems when
considered in conjunction with Similarity. The role of Similarity is pervasive is “New Work for
a Theory of Universals.” Lewis says explicitly, “Natural properties would be the ones whose
sharing makes for resemblance…” (1983, p. 347). And in On the Plurality of Worlds, we see a
key passage about Simplicity:
“Probably it would be best to say that the distinction between natural properties and
others admits of degree. Some few properties are perfectly natural. Others, even though
they may be somewhat disjunctive or extrinsic, are at least somewhat natural in a
derivative way, to the extent that they can be reached by not-too-complicated chains of
definability from the perfectly natural properties.”
Thus, I believe the considerations of 4.2 also give us good reason to say there are no natural
properties.
Finally, if one is still not convinced, one can turn to Section 4.3 where I pointed out some
problems with the role of Magnetism as well. Dropping Magnetism seems to be another less
than desirable route for the naturalness enthusiast. Magnetism is an explanatory role that, in
Lewis’s eyes, was part of the “new work” that natural properties were supposed to do. So if that
role cannot be satisfied, then there is yet another reason to deny the existence of natural
properties.
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